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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Since it is Reason which shapes and regulates all other
things, it ought not itself be left in disorder.-EPvcxETUs, Dis-
courses, ch. 17.
CHANGES IN ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE-1950-1960:
C.P.A. §§1-20, 72, 73, AND RELATED
SUPREME COURT RULES
BEN LISS
HE MOST SIGNIFICANT changes during the past decade in Illinois
civil practice are reflected in the comprehensive revisions of
1955, effective January 1, 1956, of the Civil Practice Act.' Of
those changes, only the more important are noted in order to accom-
modate the ambitious program of this symposium issue.
EXPANDED JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTS
Section 17,2 sometimes called the "long-arm statute," is for Illinois a
new concept intended to expand in personam jurisdiction of its courts
1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 (1959), referred to herein as "the act."
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1959): "(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts herein-
after enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal repre-
sentative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising
from the doing of any of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State
at the time of contracting.
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this State, as provided in this section, may be made by personally serving the
summons upon the defendant outside this State, as provided in this Act, with the same
force and effect as though summons had been personally served within this State.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted
against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this
section.
(4) Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve any process in any
other manner now or hereafter provided by law."
MR. Liss, a member of the Illinois Bar, received an LL.B. from De Paul University.
He is a past chairman of the Chicago Bar Association Committee on Civil Practice, and
is now a member of the Executive Committee of the Illinois State Bar Association
Section on Civil Practice & Procedure. Mr. Liss is also a member of the Board of Man-
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over nonresident defendants. Its companion section' provides for the
manner of personal service of summons outside the state. The consti-
tutionality of those sections has been established in Nelson v. Miller,4
where the court said: "Sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act
reflect a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause." 5 This was
the first consideration by the court of these sections and it noted the
significant social, technological, and legal developments which had
occurred since Pennoyer v. Neff,' which founded jurisdiction of a
court on physical power. The change was made most manifest by
International Shoe Co. v. Washington7 where the Court held that the
limits on the exercise of jurisdiction were to be found only in the
requirement that provisions made for this purpose must be fair and
reasonable and must give to the defendant adequate notice of the
claim against him and an adequate and realistic opportunity to appear
and be heard in his defense. The court in the Nelson case quoted from
International Shoe:
"[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ",8
Section 17, being procedural in nature, was also held to apply retro-
actively to causes of action which arose prior to its effective date.'
Since Nelson, the extent of "minimum contacts" has begun to take
shape, and every touching or contact in Illinois has not been sufficient
to extend jurisdiction over nonresidents. It appears that there is re-
quired some physical presence of the defendant in addition to the
statutory requirement ° that the cause of action arise from the specific
transaction. 1 In Orton v. Woods Oil & Gas Co.," an engineer and a
8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S16 (1959).
4 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
5 Id. at 389, 143 N.E.2d at 679.
695 U.S. 714 (1877).
7 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8 Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 384, 143 N.E.2d 673, 677 (1957) (quoting from In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
9Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Sunday v. Donovan, 16 I11.
App.2d 116, 147 N.E.2d 401 (1958).
10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(3) (1959).
11 On this point, consult Comment, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 238, 245 (1960).
12 249 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1957).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
lawyer, employed by defendant in New Orleans, brought suit to
recover fees for services which were rendered in Illinois. The services
included the creation of a Delaware corporation out of a sole proprie-
torship and the registration of its stock so that it could engage in busi-
ness outside Illinois. In holding that there were not the sufficient mini-
mum contacts required by due process, the court said:
The fact that plaintiffs did most of their actual work in Chicago in accom-
plishing their assignments seems to us to be a slender thread on which to hang
their claim for jurisdiction over defendant in Illinois. We do not believe that
defendant had such "minimum contacts" with the territory of the forum
chosen by plaintiffs to subject it to a judgment in personam. To do so, would
"offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
To rule otherwise would be to stretch the doctrine of the International Shoe
case to the breaking point, and to expand the Illinois concept of state jurisdic-
tion over nonresidents beyond the limit imposed by due process.' 3
In Bluff Creek Oil Co. v. Green, 4 an interpleader suit brought in
Texas, it was contended that the default judgment obtained in Illinois
was void for want of jurisdiction. All of the negotiations for the pur-
chase of a working interest in Texas oil leases took place in Illinois and
the agreement was made there; though the papers were prepared in
Oklahoma, they were returned to Chicago for final execution and de-
livery there. The court found no difficulty in finding the connection
with Illinois to invest it with the power to make service of its process
effective against nonresidents without violating the federal constitu-
tion.
"Minimum contacts," despite the appreciable value of the goods in-
volved, were lacking in Groback v. Addo Mach. Co.,15 and defendant
was found not to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts.
A contract of exclusive distributorship was consummated in New York
by a letter from defendant in New York to plaintiffs in Chicago after
defendant's agent met with plaintiffs in Illinois for pre-contract nego-
tiations. After two years of purchases for resale in Illinois, defendant
cancelled the distributorship and used plaintiffs' customer list by giving
it to the newly appointed distributor. In the suit under the contract,
defendant contended that it had not transacted business within Illinois
and did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts. The court
13 Id. at 202-03.
14 257 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1958).
15 16 Il1.2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959)
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
noted that defendant manufactured the machines outside Illinois, did
not maintain any offices in Illinois, nor employ any officers, agents,
employees, or other persons within the state; that sales were consum-
mated when plaintiffs placed orders with defendant in New York and
defendant accepted the orders, delivering its product to independent
carriers in New York. The court held that plaintiffs were independent
businessmen in Illinois selling their own merchandise, which had been
manufactured by defendant, and that plaintiffs were not transacting
business for the defendant in Illinois, but were transacting business for
themselves. It distinguished Nelson, in which defendant's agent was
in Illinois and his activity there gave rise to the injury for which the
action was brought.
In Kaye-Martin v. Brooks,16 where a contract for the sale of stock
had its origin in New York but was executed in its final form in Texas,
it was held that the meeting of the broker, the New York buyer, and
the Arkansas seller for discussing the terms of the sale, arranged to be
held in Chicago for the convenience of the seller, who was attending
a convention there, did not constitute transaction of business in Illinois
such as would justify Illinois in asserting jurisdiction in personam over
the seller in an action for breach of that contract.
The same result is obtained in the area of torts. In Trippe Mfg. Co.
v. Spencer Gifts, Inc.,"' a suit charging unfair competition, defendant,
a New Jersey corporation, engaged in the mail order business in New
Jersey and mailed its catalogues to Illinois. To plaintiff's contention
that defendant's activities in mailing the catalogues to Illinois came
within the provisions of section 17, the court held "that under Illinois
law, defendant did not have those 'minimal contacts' which are essen-
tial to the transaction of any business within the state of Illinois.' 8
Similarly, a foreign publishing corporation was held not to be transact-
ing business in Illinois merely because it shipped its publications into
the state to subscribers or to independent contractors for resale.' 9
16267 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 832 (1959). But see National
Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 959 (1960), where "... . [the] acts of defendant's representatives, which occurred
in Illinois, constitute at least such minimal contacts with that state that the maintenance
of this suit there does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 475.
17 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959).
's Id. at 823.
19 Insull v. New York, World Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960). See also Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F.
Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957) (a products liability case where the damage only occurred
in Illinois), and Wing v. Challenge Mach. Co., 23 F.R.D. 669 (S.D. Ill. 1959).
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The solicitation and securing of two purchase orders in Illinois,
coupled with a promise to send an employee into the state to train the
purchaser in the use of equipment purchased was held to be a transac-
tion of "some business in Illinois" and thus within section 17 (1) (e). 20
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS AND DECREES
Section 72 of the act, as greatly expanded by the 1955 revisions,
"substitutes a simple remedy by petition21 for various forms of post-
judgment relief theretofore available, [and] enables a party to bring
before the court rendering a judgment matters of fact not appearing in
the record which, if known to the court at the time the judgment was
entered, would have prevented its rendition.... - It states that
writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis, writs of audita querela, bills of
review and bills in the nature of bills of review are abolished, and that all re-
lief previously obtainable and the grounds for relief previously available, ei-
ther at law or in equity whether by any of the foregoing remedies or other-
wise, continues to be available in every case, by proceedings under this section,
regardless of the nature of the order, judgment or decree from which relief is
sought or of the proceedings in which it was entered. 23
The petition for post-judgment relief under this section "is not
available as a substitute for an appeal. ' '24 The statute was enacted for
the purpose of reaching a judgment which would not have been ren-
dered had matters of fact not appearing of record been known to the
court at the time of the rendition of the judgment. ' 25 It is applicable in
both suits at law and in equity,2 and it has become an effective tool for
seting aside a default judgment, the existence of which was concealed
2 0 Berlemann v. Superior Distrib. Co., 17 111. App.2d 522, 151 N.E.2d 116 (1958). See
also Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1957). (Transaction of
business does not mean doing business.)
21 The petition may be filed after thirty days (§ 72 (1)) but must be filed within two
years after entry of the order, judgment, or decree ( 72(3)).
22 Brockmeyer v. Duncan, 18 Ill.2d 502, 505, 165 N.E.2d 294, 295 (1960); Frederick
v. Maggio, 23 Ill. App.2d 292, 162 N.E.2d 590 (1959).
23 Collins v. Collins, 14 Ill.2d 178, 182, 151 N.E.2d 813, 815 (1958); see also Van Dam
v. Van Dam, 21 I1l.2d 212, 171 N.E.2d 594 (1961) (petition for rehearing not filed).
24 Van Dam v. Van Dam, supra note 23 at 218, 171 N.E.2d at 598 (citing Collins v.
Collins, 14 Ill.2d 178, 151 N.E.2d 813 (1958)).
25 United States ex rel. Barrigar v. Robinson, 189 F.2d 766, 767 (7th Cir. 1951); see
also O'Connell v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 23 El. App.2d 364, 163 N.E.2d 213 (1959).
26 Ellman v. DeRuiter, 412 Ill. 285, 106 N.E.2d 350 (1952); Frederick v. Maggio, 23
Ill. App.2d 292, 162 N.E.2d 590 (1959).
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and which was obtained by excusable mistake, 7 but it "is not intended
to relieve a defendant from the consequences of his own negligence ' 28
or the incompetence of his attorney.29
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE JUDGMENTS
Section 73 of the act and Supreme Court Rule 24,30 effective Janu-
ary 1, 1956, introduced a substantially new and comprehensive pro-
cedure to enable a judgment creditor to discover and have applied
assets of the judgment debtor to the satisfaction of the judgment
against him. The procedure does not supersede any other method of
satisfying a judgment.,1 It is commenced against the debtor or any
other person by the service of a summons issued by the clerk of court3 2
and as to the discovered non-exempt assets or income of the judgment
debtor, the court may: (a) compel the debtor to deliver property to
which his title or right of possession is not substantially disputed, (b)
compel the debtor to pay in installments a reasonable portion of his
income, (c) compel any person cited, other than the debtor, to deliver
any assets against which debtor could have proceeded, (d) enter any
order against the person cited that could be entered in any garnishment
proceeding, (e) compel any person cited to assign any property or
chose in action to the same extent as could be done by a court of
chancery, and (f) authorize the judgment creditor to sue any persons
indebted to the debtor.33
The citation may be given the same holding effect as the service of
a garnishment summons, for it may on its face provide for a prohibi-
tion against the party to whom it is directed from transferring or per-
mitting the transfer of any property belonging to the judgment debtor
or to which he may be entitled.3 4 Though it has been argued that the
provision is unconstitutional because the prohibition against such trans-
fer is injunctive, and thus in effect gives the clerk of court the right to
issue an injunction, probably the better reasoning is to liken the effect
27 Ellman v. DeRuiter, supra note 26.
28 Till v. Kara, 22 111. App.2d 502, 509, 161 N.E.2d 363, 366 (1959).
29 Brockmeyer v. Duncan, 18 Ill.2d 502, 165 N.E.2d 294 (1960).
30 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 101.24 (1959).
31 ILL. RiEv. STAT. ch. 110, S 73 (8) (1959).
3 2 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 73 (1) (1959).
33 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 73 (2) (a)-(f) (1959).
34 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 73 (4) (a) (1959).
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of the restraining provision here with the effect of a garnishment sum-
mons or attachment writ,35 as to which there is no question. 6
A significant change in practice is the effect of a continuing garnish-
ment obtained by this procedure. Such an effect cannot be obtained
under the provisions of the Garnishment Act,3 7 and it has been held
that a garnishment brought under that act cannot be converted into a
supplementary proceeding to obtain the benefit of a continuing gar-
nishment.88
To dispel all doubt as to the power of the court to enforce the cita-
tion, order, or other directive of the court, Supreme Court Rule
24 (8) 3 provides for punishment for contempt as well as for execution
against property.
IMPROPER VENUE
Improper venue may now be raised only as provided in section 8 (2)
of the act. The practice previously had been for the defendant to raise
the point by a motion to dismiss the action for lack of venue or by
motion to transfer or by answer;40 now the question is raised exclusive-
ly by a motion to transfer to a proper venue. The motion must be
made by the date on which defendant is required to appear or within
any further time granted to him to plead, and unless the question is
raised as provided in this section, all objections of improper venue are
waived.41
JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF CITY COURTS
There have been some significant decisions involving the jurisdic-
tion and venue of city, village, and town courts created and established
pursuant to the City Court Act.42 "There has been much confusion in
35 Fins, Tone & Liss, May a Clerk of Court by Citation Under Section 73 of the Civil
Practice Act Without an Order of a Judge Prohibit the Transfer of Assets? 44 ILL.
B.J. 818 (1956).
36 Id. at 820. (See cases cited.)
37 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 62, S§ 39(b), (c) (1959).
38 National Home, Inc. v. American Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 16 Ill. App.2d 111, 147
N.E.2d 412 (1958).
80 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.24(8) (1959).
40 Dever v. Bowers, 341 111. App. 444, 94 N.E.2d 518 (1950).
41 Except that if a defendant upon whose residence venue depends is dismissed upon
motion of plaintiff, a remaining defendant may promptly move for transfer as though
the dismissed defendant had not been a party. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 8(2) (1959).
42 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 333 (1959).
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the cases, due to undue restrictions, from a narrow interpretation of
the constitutional provisions, to the confounding of the questions of
territorial jurisdiction and venue, and to unnecessary and inaccurate
dicta.' 48 The statute, insofar as relevant, provides: "The several courts
of record... in and for any city,. . . shall be courts of general jurisdic-
tion in and for the cities... wherein they are respectively established,
... concurrently with the Circuit Court."44 It also provides that for the
purpose of determining venue in civil cases the provisions of the venue
statutes shall be construed as if the city wherein the city court is estab-
lished was a county of which such city court was the circuit court.
In Turnbaugh v. Dunlop,45 our court expressely overruled whatever
statements it had previously made contrary to its expression in that
case. After stating the general rule that transitory actions "may be
brought whenever the wrongdoer may be found within the territory
for which the court exists, or whenever jurisdiction over his person is
otherwise obtained, ' 46 the court held that the words "in and for"
did not bar a city court from assuming jurisdiction of a transitory
cause of action arising outside the territorial limits of the city, and
declared that "if he [defendant] resides in a city or is found within
its borders and is properly before the court, jurisdictional requirements
have been satisfied regardless of where the acts were performed giving
rise to liability. '47 It noted, however, that this jurisdictional right may
be asserted subject only to statutes pertaining to venue limiting it.
In a similar overruling mood, our court, in Chappelle v. Sorenson,"
held that under the City Court Act49 "a city court may send its original
process beyond the corporate limits of the city, the same as a circuit
court,"5 and in doing so recognized the problem essentially to be one
of venue."
43Turnbaugh v. Dunlop, 406 111. 573, 574-75, 94 N.E.2d 438 ,439 (1950).
44ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, S 333 (1959).
45406 Ill. 573, 94 N.E.2d 438 (1950). Followed in United Biscuit Co. v. Voss, 407 Ill.
488, 95 N.E.2d 439 (1950), under the Municipal Court Act of Chicago, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 37, §§ 356-426 (1959); Starck v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 4 ll.2d 616, 123 N.E.2d 826
(1954).
46Turnbaugh v. Dunlop, supra note 45 at 585, 94 N.E.2d at 443.
47Ibid.
4811 Ill.2d 472, 143 N.E.2d 18 (1957).
49 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, S 333 (1959).
50 Chappelle v. Sorenson, 11 I11.2d 472, 474, 143 N.E.2d 18, 19 (1957).
51Ibid.
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The court's most recent consideration of the venue aspect of the
problem was in People ex rel. Norwegian-American Hosp. v. Sandus-
ky.52 The initial cause of action arose outside of the town of Cicero
and the defendant neither resided in nor did business within the town.
In awarding the writ of mandamus directing the judge to vacate the
order denying defendant's motion for transfer and to transfer the cause
to the Circuit Court of Cook County, the court said:
The venue provisions of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Star. 1959, chap.
110, pars. 5-12) contain mandatory venue requirements. When a proper mo-
tion to transfer is presented, the facts being admitted, the trial court has no
discretion but must transfer the cause. 53
After quoting the applicable portion of section 554 of the act, the court
said:
Thus to bring an action in a town court, it must be commenced (a) in the
town of residence55 of any defendant who is joined in good faith and with
probable cause for the purpose of obtaining a judgment against him and not
solely for the purpose of fixing venue in that town, or (b) in the town in
which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of
action arose. 56
These decisions may take on added importance because of the recent
increase in the number of city and town courts established5 7 and con-
templated in the periphery of Chicago.
52 21 IU.2d 296, 171 N.E.2d 640 (1961).
53 Id. at 299, 171 N.E.2d at 642.
54 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, S 5 (1959): "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every
action must be commenced (a) in the county of residence of any defendant who isjoined in good faith and with probable cause for the purpose of obtaining a judgment
against him and not solely for the purpose of fixing venue in that county, or (b) in
the county in which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the
cause of action arose."
55 For "residence" of corporations and partnerships, see ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 110, § 6
(1959). Section 6(2) (which provides that "A partnership sued in its firm name is a
resident of any county in which any partner resides or in which the partnership has
an office or is doing business," and is a nonresident if no partners are residents of this
state) is new and should be read with § 13.4, providing for service of process on a
partnership sued in its firm name, and § 27.1 providing that a partnership may be sued
in the firm name; both are new. See also ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 77, S lb (1959): "A judg-
ment rendered against a partnership in its firm name shall support execution only
against property of the partnership and shall not constitute a lien upon real estate other
than that held in the firm name."
56 People ex rel. Norwegian-American Hosp. v. Sandusky, 21 Ill.2d 296, 301, 171
N.E.2d 640, 643 (1961).
57 Town Court of Cicero, Municipal Court of Elmwood Park, Village Court of May-
wood, and Village Court of Skokie.
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UNIFORM COURT RULES
Section 2 (2) of the act58 provides: "Subject to rules [of the Supreme
Court] the city, town, circuit, superior and Appellate Courts may
make rules regulating their dockets, calendars, and business." In the
promulgation of their rules, the trial courts acted with complete inde-
pendence and without regard to the rules of the courts in neighboring
circuits and counties. In some circuits, comprising several sparse coun-
ties, the rules sometimes varied in each county, though they were in
the same circuit. In some circuit courts, there were no complete rules,
and in others where rules were said to exist, only the oldest practi-
tioners had ever seen them.
A significant development in civil practice was the adoption of uni-
form trial court rules59 by the circuit and superior courts of Cook
County, effective March 1, 1959, and their adoption in whole or in
part by most of the judicial circuits throughout the state thereafter."O
The Supreme Court of Illinois, acting through the executive commit-
tee of the Judicial Conference of Illinois, after the adoption in 1958 of
a resolution approving in principal uniform rules for the superior and
circuit courts of Illinois, appointed a committee of judges (Com-
mittee on Uniform Court Rules) to present uniform rules to the
courts. That committee had before it the final draft of rules proposed
by the Chicago Bar Association Committee on Revision of Rules.6 '
After some modification to make the proposed rules adaptable to state-
wide practice, the Judicial Conference recommended the adoption of
the uniform rules of practice. 2
As a result of the adoption of the uniform rules, for the first time an
Illinois lawyer participating in litigation outside his own local circuit
court can be reasonably certain that he knows the basic rules of the
trial court. In addition to serving to crystallize practice uniformly, the
rules also introduce some new practical concepts worthy of special
58 "Rules of court are adopted to facilitate the work of the court and they have the
force of law. They are binding on . . . [the] court the same as on litigants." People v.
Miller, 17 111. App.2d 274, 277, 149 N.E.2d 784, 786 (1958).
59 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 301.1-312.4 (1959).
60 Consult ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 301.1-312.4 (Smith-Hurd 1959), for circuits
which have adopted the rules in whole or in part.
61 Appointed at the joint request of the executive committees of both the circuit and
superior courts of Cook County.
6 2 COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM COURT RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF ILLINOIS,
RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF ILLINOIS, Foreword (1958).
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mention. A party now is entitled to only one continuance on the
ground that his attorney is engaged in another trial or hearing, 63 and a
continuance is not to be granted upon the ground of substitution or
addition of attorneys.6 4 Service of a rule or order upon a party may be
made by mail instead of by actual personal service. 5 For the first time
there is set out the mechanics for satisfaction of a money judgment if
the judgment creditor cannot be found or refuses, after a tender, to
satisfy the judgment.6 To dispel existing doubt concerning the power
of a master in chancery to rule on a motion to dismiss at the close of
the plaintiff's case, express authority is given so to do.
63 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 306.1 (a) (1959).
64 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 306.1 (b) (1959). See comment in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
S 306(1) (b) (Smith-Hurd 1959).
65 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 307.2 (a) (1959).
66 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 307.3 (1959).
67 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 309.4 (e) (1959).
